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ABSTRACT
Here we present the personal perspectives of two 
authors on the important and unfortunately frequent 
scenario of ambulance clinicians facing a deceased 
individual and family members who do not wish them 
to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation. We examine 
the professional guidance and the protection provided to 
clinicians, which is not matched by guidance to protect 
family members. We look at the legal framework in 
which these scenarios are taking place, and the ethical 
issues which are presented. We consider the interaction 
between ethics, clinical practice and the law, and offer 
suggested changes to policy and guidance which we 
believe will protect ambulance clinicians, relatives and 
the patient.
INTRODUCTION
Internationally, pre- hospital registered ambulance 
clinicians (variously called ambulance clinicians, 
paramedics and emergency services personnel) are 
often put in the invidious position of having to 
make a decision about whether or not to attempt 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) when they 
attend a call and find a patient whose heart has 
stopped. About 46% of deaths in the England occur 
in homes or nursing homes1 and ambulances are 
often called at times of health crisis, even when a 
death is expected, if caregivers feel unsure what to 
do.2 The call has been put out, the ambulance clini-
cian has responded to the call: to do nothing creates 
certainty around the individual’s death. Where the 
heart stopping is the final stage of a longer dying 
process, attempting CPR is likely to be futile, as 
the heart stopping reflects an overall physiological 
deterioration which CPR cannot reverse. In other 
circumstances, particularly in cases where the arrest 
is unexpected and the primary problem is with the 
heart, it may result in full recovery for the indi-
vidual. Or it may give the individual a chance of 
returned circulation, but with great neurological 
deficit;3 or it may restart the heart briefly, only for 
the individual to die again.4
The ambulance clinician must therefore make 
a rapid decision with potentially very significant 
repercussions. To protect them from the emotional 
work—and possible litigation—associated with 
these decisions, their recently updated UK profes-
sional guidance5 recommends: “Where no explicit 
decision about CPR has been considered and 
recorded in advance, there should be an initial 
presumption in favour of CPR.” Clinicians are, 
however, given the discretion to make decisions not 
to attempt CPR where they think it would be futile, 
‘for example, for a person in the advanced stages 
of a terminal illness where death is imminent and 
unavoidable’. However, there is no explicit mention 
of the importance of listening to family members’ 
views of what the patient would want, nor refer-
ence to the legal obligation of the ambulance clini-
cian to follow the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 
2005) and do what is in the patient’s best interests 
(which would involve taking into consideration 
what family members/friends and advocates think 
the patient would want). In the USA, guidance is 
not included on how to incorporate relatives’ views 
with best interests decisions. Ambulance clinicians 
have reported that they have not been taught to 
deal with these decisions6 and that it is often easier 
for them—both emotionally and logistically—to 
deliver attempted CPR than to consider withholding 
it. Relatives, who, after all, have been the ones to 
place the call in the first place, then feel powerless 
(and sometimes angry) when ambulance clinicians 
start CPR despite their protestations that this is ‘not 
what he/she would have wanted’. In the USA, emer-
gency services personnel have even less discretion 
than in the UK: in many states, they are bound to 
start CPR unless a specific Do Not Attempt Cardio-
pulmonary Resuscitation (DNACPR) is in place, 
even if the patient has another kind of documen-
tation, for example POLST (Physician Order for 
Life- Sustaining Treatment) until they have spoken 
to a ‘medical command physician’. They also must 
continue CPR if it has been started by a bystander 
even if a DNACPR is in place, until they are told 
they can stop by a physician.
To highlight the moral discomfort experienced 
and the ethical and legal challenges faced, we 
present the perspectives of an ambulance clinician 
and a relative, and then review the legal and ethical 
framework in which they are operating, before 
concluding with some suggested changes to policy 
and guidance which we believe will protect ambu-
lance clinicians, relatives and the patient.
AMBULANCE CLINICIAN’S PERSPECTIVE—ROB 
COLE
The following is a case study to illustrate the 
grey area faced by ambulance clinicians when 
they consider they need to make a ‘best interests’ 
decision on a patient who has arrested. This is a 
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composite case study from my experience of many such calls to 
protect the anonymity of those involved in any individual case.
An emergency call was received by the ambulance emergency 
operations control room. At this stage, it was important to clarify 
the justification for this call as this directly influences any further 
decision making. If the call was for the purpose of providing 
resuscitation to a patient in cardiorespiratory arrest then, as 
early as this stage, we can determine that at the point of call, 
somebody (accepting unable to qualify exactly whom) believes 
that the patient is either clinically indicated for resuscitation 
or someone believes they would desire or benefit from such an 
intervention. The caller identified that her husband was experi-
encing a seizure, and this had lasted for 5 min prior to her calling 
the ambulance. An ambulance was immediately despatched on 
this information alone (known as pre- alert dispatch). The loca-
tion was some 4 min from the crew and they therefore arrived on 
the scene 5 min post call (in fact, on the crew arrival, the caller 
was still on the phone with the ambulance control centre).
The crew were met by a female in her 70s (call with control 
ended on crew arrival). The crew were, as often is the case, 
provided with no further details other than that of a male in 
his 80s with a prolonged seizure. The ambulance had travelled 
under emergency conditions to the address. The female greeted 
the crew (who had approached the property with full life- saving 
emergency equipment). She stated “I think he has gone” in a 
calm and clear voice. She allowed the crew into her home and 
quickly explained (during the journey to the patient, who is 
on a bed in the dining room downstairs) that the patient was 
her husband, that he had been generally unwell for some time 
(increased frailty, heart failure and developing dementia) and 
while she had not expected him to die at this point in time, she 
was not particularly surprised that he had. One member of the 
crew (double crew) prepared the patient for resuscitation, post a 
period of assessment while the other crew member continued to 
speak with the patient’s wife to better understand the situation. 
The scene looked non- suspicious: the patient was lying peace-
fully (not breathing and with no heart rate) on a bed downstairs, 
dressed in pyjamas. The patient presented as frail in appearance 
but other than that, there was no further information of note.
The member of the crew that spoke with the wife of the patient 
and ascertained that the patient was being treated by a general 
physician for a simple urinary tract infection, that there was no 
DNACPR in place as there was no specific requirement for one to 
have been put in place; no advance decision to refuse treatment 
(the female had no idea what this was) nor was there any legal 
power of attorney (the patient until this point had been broadly 
of sound mind with occasional episodes of confusion). As the 
other member of the ambulance crew commenced resuscitation 
(CPR), the patient’s wife angrily stated that her husband would 
not wish for this, nor did she or any member of her family. She 
reiterated that the 999 call was due to a seizure, and had it been 
for the purpose of providing resuscitation, she would not have 
called the emergency services and all agreed that this was not the 
wish of the patient. Accepting this is not documented anywhere, 
the patient’s wife explained that these were conversations that 
had taken place within the family environment, that her husband 
had a clear view that he would not want to be subjected to any 
resuscitative efforts should he die, and funeral arrangements had 
been explored recently by all.
To add, the patient’s wife appeared to be of sound mind, no 
obvious level of confusion and not in any particular state of 
heightened distress. The son of the patient was 10 min away 
from the address and on his way. A neighbour had also arrived 
at the property.
To summarise, cardiac arrest of a patient in his 80s, not 
expected to die but family not surprised (had been quite unwell 
recently), no DNACPR or other documented evidence of the 
patient’s thoughts, wishes and beliefs. Call for emergency help 
was to manage a seizure and NOT provide resuscitation.
FAMILY CARER PERSPECTIVE—MIKE STONE
When my mother died about 10 years ago,7 I might have found 
myself as a relative trying to prevent a 999 paramedic from 
attempting CPR, but in the event, I found myself being ‘confronted 
by’ 999 personnel who seemed unable to understand why when 
my mum died at the end of a peaceful 4- day terminal coma, I 
had NOT felt the need ‘to phone someone immediately’. This 
prompted me to embark on an investigation into end- of- life (EoL) 
guidance, protocols, mindsets and laws, which revealed to me a 
situation I can, at best, describe as urgently requiring improve-
ment, especially but not exclusively for EoL- at- home, and which, 
in complex and confusing situations, protects professionals at the 
expense of damaging relatives and, sometimes, even patients.
From my family carer perspective, this situation has to change. 
And, the direction of change must be one which improves the 
support given to patients, by promoting integration between 
everyone, lay and professional, involved in supporting patients. 
This ‘model’ requires ‘us and us’ as opposed to ‘us and them’: it 
emphasises teamwork between family carers and the clinicians 
who are in regular and ongoing contact with the patient, and it 
replaces ‘multidisciplinary team thinking’, with genuine profes-
sional- lay integration.
Anyone can listen to a patient—provided you are present to 
listen: if only a relative is present, only the relative can listen. 
Often it will require a clinician, such as a 999 paramedic, to 
confirm that a patient is in cardiopulmonary arrest, but the 
family carer who called 999, is the person most likely to know 
if the patient would have wanted CPR. Put simply, the clinicians 
are the experts in the clinical aspects, and the family and friends 
are the experts in ‘the patient as an individual’.
I believe the current guidance around CPR decision- making is 
unsatisfactory and incoherent, and must be made more sensible 
and coherent.8–10 Contemporary protocols for ‘expected death’ 
are also fundamentally flawed.11 Advance decisions often fail to 
achieve the patient’s objective, apparently because clinicians are 
risk- averse.12
I have only mentioned a few of the more significant problems, 
and those I have mentioned could, in theory, be addressed by 
consensus followed by improved training. Other fundamental 
problems—notably the fact that relatively few people have 
personal experience of caring for a loved one all the way to a 
death at home—are more problematic.
To close this brief and personal analysis, I will give two opin-
ions. The first is that the change required is easy to see, and 
involves things such as more group- based and ‘diffusely achieved’ 
decision- making instead of identifiable individuals being invari-
ably associated with and responsible for specific decisions. But 
it is a change which a hierarchical and process/records- based 
National Health Service (NHS) would really struggle to come 
to terms with.13
The second is my optimism that growing pressure from 
patients and relatives will make the changes in behaviour inevi-
table, because, perhaps surprisingly, of social media.14
LEGAL ANALYSIS—ALEX RUCK KEENE
Mike’s experiences speak clearly of the practical problems 
caused by paramedics misunderstanding the law.
3Cole R, et al. J Med Ethics 2020;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106490
Clinical ethics
If there is a situation in which CPR would simply not work 
to restart the heart or breathing, then the paramedics would be 
under no duty to attempt it, as there is no duty to seek to carry 
out a futile procedure. However, if it appeared that it might 
work, then the paramedics are, in England and Wales, governed 
by the MCA 2005. In practice, the realities confronted by para-
medics are such that the majority of their decision- making will 
be governed by the MCA 2005. This Act provides a framework 
for decision- making in relation to those with impaired decision- 
making capacity which is (unlike legal frameworks in some other 
jurisdictions) not predicated on there being an automatic proxy 
decision- maker, such as a ‘next of kin.’ Rather, the Act provides 
(in s.5) that any person—such as a paramedic—is able to carry 
out an act of care and treatment in relation to another (‘P’) with 
protection from liability if they: (1) take reasonable steps to 
determine whether P has the capacity to consent to the act; and 
(2) if P lacks capacity, that they reasonably believe that they are 
acting in P’s best interests.
In all situations, the first step is to consider whether the person 
has capacity to make their own decision—to consent to or refuse 
CPR. In the scenario presented by Rob Cole, as with almost all 
situations where CPR is required, the patient was unconscious 
and there were no practicable steps that could be taken to 
support him within the time available: reaching the conclusion 
that the patient did not have capacity could therefore have been 
effectively instantaneous.
The paramedics had taken reasonable steps to ascertain 
whether the person had made an advance decision to refuse CPR 
(as a medical treatment), and that he had not made one.
This means that they were therefore required to decide 
whether it was in his best interests for them to attempt it.
‘Best interests’ is, deliberately, not defined in the MCA 2005. 
However, s.4 sets out a series of matters that must be considered 
whenever a person is determining what is in the person’s best 
interests to allow them to have a reasonable belief as to they 
are acting in those best interests. It is extremely important to 
recognise that the MCA 2005 does not specify what is in the 
person’s best interests. Rather, it sets down a process by which 
that conclusion should be reached, which recognises that a lack 
of decision- making capacity is not an ‘off- switch’ for their rights 
and freedom (Wye Valley NHS Trust v- Mr B ]2015[ EWCOP 
60 in paragraph 11). The process aims to construct a decision on 
behalf of the person who cannot make that decision themselves. 
As the Supreme Court emphasised in Aintree University NHS 
Hospitals Trust v James [2014] UKSC 67 “[t]he purpose of the 
best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s point 
of view.” It is critically important to understand that the purpose 
of the decision- making process is to try to arrive at the decision 
that is the right decision for the person themselves, as an indi-
vidual human being, and not the decision that best fits with the 
outcome that the professionals desire. Any information about 
the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values will be relevant, 
including, in particular, preferences and recommendations docu-
mented when the person had capacity.
Consultation will also be required with those who could shed 
light on the person’s likely decision, here his wife. The case of 
Winspear v City Hospitals Sunderland NHS Foundation Trust 
[2015] EWHC 3250 (QB) made clear that a failure to consult 
where it is practicable and appropriate will mean that profes-
sionals cannot then rely on the defence in s.5 of MCA to what 
might otherwise be criminal acts.
In making a best interests decision about giving life- sustaining 
treatment, there is always a strong presumption that it will be 
in the patient’s best interests to prolong his or her life, and the 
decision- maker must not be motivated by a desire to bring about 
the person’s death for whatever reason, even if this is from a 
sense of compassion. However, the strong presumption in favour 
of prolonging life can be displaced where:
 ► There is clear evidence that the person would not want the 
treatment in question in the circumstances that have arisen.
 ► The treatment itself would be overly burdensome for the 
patient, in particular by reference to whether the patient 
accepts invasive and uncomfortable interventions or prefers 
to be kept comfortable.
 ► There is no prospect that the treatment will return the 
patient to a state of a quality of life that the patient would 
regard as worthwhile. The important viewpoint is that of the 
patient, not of the doctors or healthcare professionals.
Case law has made clear that the weight that is to be attached 
to the reliably ascertainable views of the person should be given 
very substantial, if not determinative, weight (Re AB (Termina-
tion of Pregnancy) [2019) EWCA Civ 1215]. In a case such as 
that described in the scenario of the ambulance clinician, and 
given the clarity of the views expressed by the man’s wife in 
relation to what he would have wanted, the paramedics could 
properly conclude that attempting CPR was not in his best inter-
ests. The Supreme Court has confirmed that they should not 
then attempt it: NHS Trust v Y [2018] UKSC 22.
Drawing the legal threads together, therefore, in a situation 
such as this:
1. Unless the paramedics have a proper reason to doubt the 
good faith of the family member present, they should pro-
ceed on the basis that they are reliable in relaying what the 
person would have wanted.
2. The paramedics can then either start or not start CPR ac-
cordingly because they have the necessary reasonable belief 
that they are acting in the person’s best interests.
3. If there is reason to doubt the good faith of the family mem-
ber present, or the family member does not (or cannot) relay 
clear views, the paramedics should start CPR. It may be that 
after they have started, they are able to glean further infor-
mation which makes the picture clearer and enables them to 
decide whether continuing is in the patient’s best interests.
ETHICAL OVERVIEW AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE—ZOË 
FRITZ (AND OTHER AUTHORS)
Law, ethical principles and professional clinical guidelines influ-
ence each other.15 In an ideal system, this would ensure just 
care with recognition of the rights of practitioners and patients. 
When it works badly, the ‘letter of the law’ is followed, even 
when it runs counter to good ethics, with potentially devastating 
personal consequences. The composite scenario and personal 
events, described above by an ambulance clinician and a family 
member, reflect examples of where medical practitioners 
believed they were following the law, but where their actions 
could be argued to have been unethical.
In contrast, a related example of the law working positively 
to overturn accepted clinical guidance and practice, is around 
the need to discuss a decision not to attempt CPR with a patient. 
The 2007 joint guidance issued by the British Medical Associa-
tion, Royal College of Nursing and the Resuscitation Council 
(UK) (2007) stated: “When a clinical decision is made that CPR 
should not be attempted, because it will not be successful, and 
the patient has not expressed a wish to discuss CPR, it is not 
necessary or appropriate to initiate discussion with the patient to 
explore their wishes regarding CPR.” The case of Janet Tracey 
challenged this: the judges in the court of appeal found that not 
4 Cole R, et al. J Med Ethics 2020;0:1–4. doi:10.1136/medethics-2020-106490
Clinical ethics
discussing a decision to withhold CPR with a patient was in 
breach of their human rights (Article 8 European Convention 
on Human Rights) as it deprived them of the right to question 
the clinical decision or ask for a second opinion, particularly 
in the context of a potentially life- saving treatment.16 Clinicians 
rapidly changed their practice; in fact, the whole nature of CPR 
conversations was altered to ensure that it was not considered 
in isolation, but always discussed within overall goals of care; in 
being forced to discuss CPR with patients, doctors reconsidered 
the conversation, what it meant and when it could and should 
occur.17
The ReSPECT (Recommended Summary Plan for Emergency 
Care and Treatment) process emerged from this as a way of 
nudging doctors and patients into having better conversations 
and documentation of agreed recommendations;18 it is now used 
in more than 130 trusts.19
While, at first glance, there may appear to be ethical and legal 
tensions in the scenarios described above, it is possible that good 
training and professional guidance would dispel them. If families 
were better supported to understand what may happen where a 
loved one dies at home, they would be better equipped to deal 
with the crisis when it came; specific resources are needed. If, 
for example, there had been a specific number to call for an 
expected death, other than 999, in the two deaths reported here, 
then neither of these upsetting scenarios would have occurred. 
As mentioned above, social media may be another positive force 
in both applying pressure for change, and in acting as a leveller 
in terms of access to information.
If the professional guidance and other material—published 
by Joint Royal Colleges Ambulance Liaison Committee, Royal 
College of Nursing, Resuscitation Council UK and so on—stated 
clearly that, where death was expected and CPR appeared to 
be futile, even in the absence of a DNACPR or ReSPECT form, 
an ambulance clinician or qualified nurse could decide that 
attempting CPR was clinically pointless or potentially harmful, 
then clinicians would not need to choose between what they 
considered morally right and what they had to do to protect 
their professional registration.
The new JRCALC guidance takes this into account, and it is 
likely that other guidance will also be explicit about this in the 
future; they should also be explicit about the role of the MCA 
and best interests decisions. An honest carer, family member 
who protests, “… but my husband would definitely not want 
CPR—don’t do that!” may be perceived as applying the MCA to 
her own determination of what is in her husband’s best interests, 
even if the wife has no awareness of the MCA.
If the ambulance clinicians were taught clearly that acting in 
the patient’s ‘best interests’ in this scenario most often meant 
doing as the relatives asked, then the (frequently internalised) 
concern that they were choosing between what was right for the 
patient and what was right for the patient’s relative would be 
abolished, and the associated moral discomfort diminished. We 
recognise that there will, in some cases, be a different tension—
where the ambulance clinician considers that the CPR will not be 
successful but the relatives want it to take place. But this is where 
the distinction between the ambulance clinician as the expert 
in the medical procedure and the relative as the expert in the 
person comes in—nobody can demand medical treatment which 
is inappropriate, and CPR is no different.The guidance and 
the training should emphasise the teawork which Mike Stone 
mentions above: the default assumption should be that clinicians 
and relatives have a shared goal of what is best for the patient, 
and work together as ‘us and us’ as opposed to ‘us and them’.
Correction notice This paper has been updated since last published to correct a 
significant typographical error in the final sentence.
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